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Abstract 
A considerable influence of advocates and judges of common law training has been recorded over time in 
adjudication of the Sharī‛ah disputes in Nigeria and Zanzibar. This is due to the colonial heritage of the British 
common law which exported the paradigm to these countries. This seems not to go down well with the Sharī‛ah 
advocates. The increasing influence of trained advocates and judges in common law in these countries has not 
comparatively received academic attention over the years. This is more so that judicial institution whose officers in 
the temple of justice do not have deep knowledge of its legal jurisprudence may affect the justice of the matter in 
those courts. Against this backdrop, the paper makes a critical exposition of the influence of common law advocates 
and judges in the adjudication of the Sharī‛ah disputes in Nigeria and Zanzibar. To achieve this, it examines 
appearance of advocates in the Sharī‛ah courts from the constitutional and Sharī‛ah perspectives. It also discusses 
how common law trained judges have their influences in the adjudication of the Sharī‛ah disputes. It makes far 
reaching recommendations which, if adopted, it will enrich the legal policy of justice of these countries and similar 
jurisdictions. This paper adopts content analysis of legal issues and interviews conducted for some stake holders in 
Zanzibar.     
Keywords: Common law advocates and judges, Sharī‛ah/ Kadhis Courts, Sharī‛ah, Policy, Nigeria, Zanzibar, 
Constitution 
 
1. Introduction 
The ability of any judicial institution to make a meaningful progress in the administration of justice depends to a 
large extent on its officers in the temple of justice (Sambo & Shamrahayu, 2012). They need to be knowledgeable 
and versatile in the areas in which they operate. Those who act as advocates for the parties and the court itself play 
an important role in the justice sector. Where their knowledge of the legal jurisprudence is not taken into 
consideration in making them to have a say in courts’ decision, this may not serve the justice of the matter. This is the 
major problems with the adjudication of the Sharī‛ah matters in Nigeria and Zanzibar. This is because at one stage or 
the other, advocates and judges with common law training have their ways in the administration of the Sharī‛ah 
issues. 
 
The choice on Nigeria and Zanzibar seems to be motivated by the similar legal pluralism being operated in both 
countries. Both countries are based in the African continent with similar colonial heritage having been colonized by 
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the British. Even during the period of colonialism, the Sharī‛ah courts existed and were given some measure of 
protection in both countries. The legal system, with respect to the issues of the Sharī‛ah, is similar to the extent that 
some judges trained in Nigeria are being seconded to Zanzibar to sit as judges in the courts. As a result of the plural 
legal system, there has been influence of the common law trained judges and advocates in the issues of the Sharī‛ah.  
  
In view of the above, the paper makes a critical exposition of the experience in Nigeria and Zanzibar with respect to 
the influence of common law advocates and judges in the Sharī‛ah Courts. To achieve this, the paper is divided into 
five parts. The first part is the introduction setting the tone of the paper. The paper will examine the issue of 
appearance of counsel in both courts. The second part examines the Sharī‛ah perspective to the role of counsel in the 
Sharī‛ah courts. The third part examines the influence of common law judges in the Sharī‛ah courts while the last 
makes concluding remarks.  
 
2. Appearance of Counsel in the Sharia Courts  
 
The colonialists introduced lawyers into the Nigerian legal system. Prior to this period, the notion of trained lawyers 
was practically unknown in traditional legal systems in Nigeria (Adewoye, 1997). The lawyers are not part of the 
Islamic law system. During the colonial era, legal practitioners appearing in customary and Islamic courts were not 
common. Area Courts 22 and Sharia Courts of 22 S. 28 (1), Area Courts Edict (No. 2, 1976, Kwara State) prevented 
lawyers from appearing as counsel (Tabiu, 1985). This has been the creation and throughout the various evolutions of 
the two courts. These provisions have not been statutorily repealed. Yet, at present, legal practitioners appear in both 
courts with such regularity that their right of audience may seem settled and beyond question. The lawyer’s right of 
audience in civil cases in the Area Court and the Sharia Court of Appeal appears to be the outcome of Karimatu 
Yakubu and Anor v Yakubu Paiko and Anor (1961–1989) 1 Sh.L.R.N. 126), decided by the Court of Appeal in 1985. 
It has been argued that the appeal was wrongly decided (Oba, 2002).
1
 The decision in the appeal has been said to 
have had a serious effect on the Nigerian legal system. Nevertheless, in spite of the importance of the issue raised in 
the appeal, the issue was not adequately in issue before the court, nor was the judgment been subjected to strict 
scrutiny. Rather, there was no critical examination of the issue before the Court. Thus, the ratio decidendi of the case 
needs further consideration for some reasons.
2
   
 
In Zanziba, however, advocates have little or no influence in the Sharī‛ah courts. However, this is not without some 
effects. it is important to note that under the level of District Kadhis’ Court up to the Chief Kadhis’ Court, the 
involvement of advocate is not allowed; only Wakils
3
 and person who are holding power of attorney are allowed to 
appear in Kadhis’ Court to represent the parties. On the other way around, it can be argued that, though there are some 
reasons for not allowing advocates to appear before the Kadhis’ Courts. This has the advantage to the extent that the 
court will not be polluted with common law ideas knowingfullywell that the Sharī‛ah has its own separate legal 
jurisprudence. However, generally, the idea of not allowing them to serve as advocates before these courts is another 
set back towards the administration of justice particularly to women who appear before these courts to defend their 
cases. The case might be different when it appears that those Wakils appointed hold the qualifications of having Islamic 
law and Civil Procedure Decree. If that was the case, they might improve the administration purpose under Kadhis’ 
Courts. The main question now is based on how the aspect of justice can be done in a situation where both the Kadhis 
and parties to the cases are not well conversant with the procedure provided by the law of the country. This is well 
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emphasised by the Zanzibar Constitution, 1984 which provides that: 
 
When the rights and duties of any person are being determined by the court or any other agency, that 
person shall be entitled to a fair hearing and to the right of appeal or other legal remedy against the 
decision of the court or of the other agency concerned (Article 12 (6) of the Zanzibar Constitution, 
1984). 
 
The situation is a bit different to the level of High Court where most of the time a judge who hears the appeal from 
Chief Kadhis’ Court with the help of four Ulamaas and sometimes with the involvement of advocates comes up with 
detailed and explanatory judgment after referring different Islamic sources 
 
3. The Sharī‛ah Perspective 
 
The issue of appearance of lawyers in Sharia Courts of Appeal and Area Courts at present may still be an issue in 
court. A more basic question, however, relates to the role of legal practitioners within an Islamic legal system. It has 
been argued that whilst the Sharī‛ah allows for legal representation, lawyers in the common law mould are not 
known in the Sharī‛ah system, (Zubair, 1996, Joseph, 1964). There is clear tradition of the Prophet (s.a.w), which 
cast doubt on eloquent advocacy in a litigant. The tradition states: I am but a human, and I give judgment according 
to what I hear [from parties], but should I decide in favour of a party because that party is better in tendering their 
own case, when in fact the other party to the dispute is the one in the right, then the party in whose favour judgement 
was erroneously rendered has reserved for himself a place in hell (Doi, 1990).  
 
Two main features of the Sharī‛ah system: the concept of legal representation and the role of muftis are commonly 
confused with lawyers. This uncertainty is unlimited to non- Sharī‛ah practitioners (Ambali, 1998). Legal 
representation under Islamic law is just a form of agency (Wikalah). The agent (Wakili) is not a professional pleader. 
There appears to be no such known profession in Islamic law. The Wakili has no special status in court and need not 
be an expert in law. He appears in court in place of and at the place of a party. It is as if he is the party himself. This 
is different from the common law arrangement where advocacy is a professional calling and the lawyer being an 
officer of the court has distinct status and privileges in court. The nearest equivalent of a Wakili in the common law 
system is probably a non-lawyer who is authorised by a party to represent him in a case.  
 
The Lawyer is similar to the Mufti in the fact that he is an expert learned in law. Judges and litigants alike can consult 
lawyers for his legal opinion. He appears different from lawyers because he does not fight partisan causes in court. 
He only does religious duty on him to make available his knowledge for the guidance of his community. Adewoye 
aptly summarised the role of Muftis in the pre-colonial Sokoto Caliphate thus 
 
In the performance of their judicial duties, the alkalai usually bore much of the judicial burden, holding the scale of 
justice evenly between the parties. But in such centers of Islam as Sokoto, Kano, Zaria, they sometimes sought the 
assistance of the mufti, learned Mallams who were deeply knowledgeable about the  Sharī‛ah. Their duty was to 
develop the law. They were like the jurisconsults of the Roman times, except that their judicial opinion was 
invariably based on actual cases and precedents. They gave their opinions in the open court upon questions submitted 
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to them by the alkali. Although they were the expounders of the  Sharī‛ah law, they differ from professional 
advocates in the European sense in that they could not be engaged to fight partisan causes in open court. They could 
be consulted on any legal question. Usually important figures in the state performing other functions, they did not 
derive their livelihood from their role as expounders of the law (Adewoye, 1977).  
 
Under the Sharī‛ah, the judge plays a dynamic role that eliminates the need for lawyers. Again, Adewoye rightly 
commented thus: It would appear that in many parts of Sokoto Caliphate, the alkalai themselves obviated the 
necessity for professional intermediaries between themselves and litigants. The point was made earlier that, as judges, 
they bore much of the judicial burden in the discharge of their duties. They cross-examined parties and their 
witnesses, sifted the evidence before them, and decided on the law applicable to particular cases (Adewoye, 1977). 
Whilst the concept of legal representation permitted under the Sharī‛ah can be extended to accommodate lawyers, as 
has been done in some countries in the Muslim world where advocates called Muhamum (sing. Muhami) appear for 
litigants before Sharī‛ah courts, (Ajetunmobi, 1988) the role of such ‘lawyers’ appears different from their role in 
common law courts. The introduction of lawyers into Sharia courts has not improved the administration of Islamic 
law in those courts. Yadudu observed that though a few lawyers possess “a smattering of fragmented knowledge of 
Islamic law”, the overwhelming majority lack any expertise in Islamic law (Yadudu, 1992). The main contributions 
of lawyers to those courts have been increased cost, delays, and technicalities (Bellgore, 2000, Yadudu, 1992). 
 
 
4. The Influence of Common Law Trained Judges in the Sharī‛ah Matters  
 
Islamic law was administered in northern Nigeria by highly trained Qadis before the advent of colonialism (keay & 
Richardson, 1966, Yadudu, 1993). When the colonial masters gained full control of the area, they allowed the 
continued existence of these courts but steadily modified and patterned them along lines in line with their own 
notions of justice Yadudu,1988, Ubah, 1982). Area Courts (and lately Sharia Courts) are the generally the courts of 
first instance for Sharī‛ah cases (Sections 15, 18, 20 and 21, Area Courts Edict, 1967). Appeals from Area Courts go 
to the Sharia Court of Appeal in matters of Islamic personal law (section 54(1) [as amended by Edict No. 5 of 1986]). 
In other matters appeals go to the High Court (section 54(3) [as amended]). Appeals from the Sharia Court of Appeal 
and the High Court go to the Court of Appeal (Sections 241, 242 and 244, 1999 Constitution). From the Court of 
Appeal, they go to the Supreme Court (S. 233(1), 1999 Constitution). Apart from the Area Courts and the Sharia 
Court of Appeal, all the courts mentioned here are manned exclusively by common law trained lawyers. Lawyers 
have even made their presence felt at the Area Courts and Sharia Courts of Appeal.
4
 
 
The issues inherent in this arrangement are numerous. First, it appears that there is a plan to make all judicial 
positions in Nigeria the exclusive preserve of common law practitioners. The second problem is that the training of 
lawyers does not adequately prepare them for the task since their training is focused exclusively on common law. 
Another is that it is difficult to understand the rationale between the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court vis-à-vis 
that of the Sharia Court of Appeal. Why should the High Court have a wider jurisdiction in the Sharī‛ah matters than 
the Sharia Court of Appeal? Why should the High Court have any jurisdiction in Islamic law matters at all? Kadis 
used to sit with High Court judges during the appellate sessions of the High Court for the purposes of hearing 
appeals in Islamic law matters. This was until it was held by the Court of Appeal in 1982 in Mallam Ado v Hajia Dija 
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(1983) 2 F.N.R. 213) that the provisions of the High Court Law that made this possible was inconsistent with the 
provisions of the 1979 Constitution. Since then appeals in Islamic law matters in the High Court have been heard 
exclusively by High Court judges. This has not gone down well with  Sharī‛ah proponents. Justice Bappa Mahmud 
commenting on this case aptly expressed the disappointment of most Muslims at the development. His Lordship said: 
Islamic law was put to such a humiliation, the like of which it has never experienced even in the hands of colonial 
masters who defeated and conquered the country. For the first time, they put the determination of appeals or cases 
decided under Islamic law in the hands of judges who are not conversant with Islamic law and most of whom are 
non-Muslims from the South (Mahmood, 1993). The point was also taken up in the Court of Appeal in Maida v 
Modu (2000 4 NWLR (Pt. 659) 99) by Justice Muntaka–Comassie thus: “It seems to me settled that the new 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does not in any way improve the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court in 
this country. It does not enhance the jurisdiction of those courts. This in my view, with all sense of responsibility, is 
unfair. In most cases, this appeal inclusive, one discovered that the land in dispute is situated in such a way that the 
rule of lex situs applies. The parties are both Moslems and consented to be governed by Islamic Law in Sharī‛ah 
Courts and lastly that the subject matters and issues involved called for intensive application of Islamic law and 
procedure which are not available in common law system. Moreover, the law to be applied in the High Court is quite 
alien to the parties and the Sharī‛ah Court. I do not think that in such circumstances justice could be said to have 
been done to the parties and the subject matter.” 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in Islamic law matters might appear excusable because the Constitution 
makes it compulsory that the Court of Appeal have on Islamic law appeal panels at least three justices who are 
learned in Islamic Law (section 247 (1) (a), 1999 Constitution). However, this is not satisfactory to many Shariah 
proponents because those justices are merely common law practitioners with generally no more than a smattering of 
knowledge of the Shariah. The Constitution merely requires that the justices who are experts in Islamic personal law 
have in addition to the regular qualification for appointment into the court, “a recognised qualification in Islamic law 
from an institution acceptable to the National Judicial Council” (section 288(2)(a), 1999 Constitution). The position 
of the Supreme Court is unsatisfactory. The Constitution does not provide for any minimum number justices of the 
court who should be learned in the Sharī‛ah. The Constitution merely states that the President in making 
appointments to the Court should have regard to the need to have justices in the court learned in the Sharī‛ah (section 
288(1), 1999 Constitution). The court is duly constituted to hear any appeal by at least five justices of the court 
(section 234, 1999 Constitution).  
 
The result is that Islamic law appeals are heard at the final appellate stage by a Supreme Court manned by persons 
who need not have any knowledge of Islamic law. This arrangement does not augur well for the development of 
Islamic Law nor can it earn the respect and confidence of litigants and  Sharī‛ah proponents alike. As rightly 
suggested, (Ajetunmobi, 1988) the Supreme Court should have at least five justices learned in Islamic law so that a 
special panel can be constituted to hear Islamic law cases as is being done in the Court of Appeal. The problem of 
lack of appropriate qualifications in Islamic law is not limited to judges with a common law background alone. Even 
some of those appointed to the  Sharī‛ah Courts as learned in Islamic personal law have grave defects in 
qualifications. In Islamic law, judges “must be not only men of deep insight, profound knowledge of the  Sharī‛ah 
but also be Allah-fearing, forthright, honest sincere men of integrity” (Doi, 1990). The issue of “profound knowledge 
of Islamic law” has been neglected. The Constitution left it to the discretion of the National Judicial Council. The 
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Constitution and other relevant laws relating to the appointment of judges for  Sharī‛ah courts do not make the 
crucial and necessary distinction between Arabists (who have studied Arabic), Islamists (who have engaged in 
Islamic Studies) and  Sharī‛ah practitioners (who have studied  Sharī‛ah) (Ambali, 1998, Ajetunmobi, 1988). In 
North Africa and the Middle East this distinction is widely known and jealously guarded.  
 
The laxity in the Nigerian approach makes the Shari’a courts to contain Arabists and Islamists. The adverse effect of 
this is that such judges are apt to be weak in Ijtihad (legal deductions), since they lack in some cases even the most 
elementary knowledge of Usul al-Fiqh (the science of Islamic law). The qualification common law of ten years’ post 
qualification experience has also been imported into the requirement of Islamic law judges. What is the relevance of 
this arbitrary time requirement to Islamic law? The uncertainty is made even worse by the introduction of the 
hierarchy based on the common law system. This hierarchy divides courts into superior and inferior courts, with the 
Area Court (Sections 261, 276 and 288, 1999 Constitution)
 5
 being an inferior court while the Sharia Court of Appeal 
is a superior court (Section 6(3), 1999 Constitution). Judges of superior courts may now tend to place themselves in 
the position of Mujtahid solely by virtue of the appointment. The Sharī‛ah insists that judges should be male and 
Muslim (It is significant that section 5(a), Sharia Court of Appeal Law, includes the religious qualification. Ambali, 
1998).
6
 These requirements can no longer be insisted upon in view of the provisions of the Constitution precluding 
discrimination on grounds of religion and sex (section 42(1), 1999 Constitution).  Sharī‛ah proponents complain 
about the colonial suppression of Islamic law by common law principles and English notions of justice (Sulaiman, 
1998). They note about the equating of common law and Islamic law courts and the application of the same 
principles to both as if they form part of the same legal system. Yadudu articulates this objection thus: The Islamic 
law, as other customary laws in the country, exists as an appendage of the English common law. It does not exist as 
an autonomous and self-regulating legal system. It is defined in terms of the common law. It applies subject to the 
standard of the common law. Its courts are established and its personnel trained and appointed in the same way and 
using virtually the same criteria as those of the common law courts and justice (Yadudu, 1988). One other problem is 
that the influx of common law practitioners into the Sharī‛ah Courts entails the danger of pollution of  Sharī‛ah 
with common law ideas. We have pointed out earlier that the common law and the Sharī‛ah are two very different 
systems. This needs some elaboration which will be done presently. 
 
In Zanzibar, although the law requires those who mount Kadhis Courts to have sufficient knowlegge of Islamic law, the 
problem seems to be with  the appellate system. Appeal from any judgement of the Chief Kadhis’ Court, Deputy Chief 
Kadhis’ Court and Appellate Kadhis’ Court lie to the High Court of Zanzibar which is the final court on cases emanated 
from Kadhis’ Courts and such appeal shall be heard by a panel of five members presided by a judge of the High Court 
and the decision is reached by taking the opinion of the majority of members (Section 10 (2) of the Kadhis, Courts Act, 
1985). 
The other four members sitting with the judge must be persons who are well conversant in Islamic laws hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Ulamaas’ and they are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission (Section 10 (3) of the Kadhis’ 
Courts Act, 1985). In terms of qualifications of the members, there is no much difference with the qualifications that 
someone must possess to be appointed as a District Kadhi whereby he has to attend and obtain a recognised 
qualification in Islamic Laws from any Institution approved by the Council of Ulamaas and has held the qualification 
for a period of not less than three years and has considerable experience in the knowledge of Islamic Laws (Section 10 
(7) of the Kadhis’ Courts Act, 1985). 
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Generally, it can be found that majority of people from different cadres and groups are not satisfied with the nature of 
rungs (levels) of appeal involved in Kadhis’ Courts. It is insisted that, the scope of appeals in the Kadhis’ Courts is very 
narrow as compared to the ordinary court where only two-tier of appeal are allowed i.e Chief Kadhis’ Court or 
Appellate Kadhis’ Court and High Court. While appeals from ordinary courts start from Primary Court and reach to the 
Court of Appeal of Tanzania. Under simple mathematics, it can be seen that, four stages of appeal exist from that scope 
contrary to the stages of appeal exist in the Kadhis’ Courts.  
 
From that particular situation, the first question which comes to the mind of any reasonable man is concerning the 
essence of having wide scope of appeal in a particular judicial system. Thus, an effective system of appeals is an 
essential part of a well-functioning system of civil justice and there can be no doubt about the importance of the 
availability of appeals to ensure that redress can be obtained for mistakes by the lower courts (Sethu, 1999). Ideally, 
appeals serve two purposes: the private purpose, which is to do justice in particular cases by correcting wrong 
decisions, and the public purpose, which is to ensure public confidence in the administration of justice by making such 
corrections and to clarify the law and to set precedents (ibid). 
 
After realising the importance of having reasonable tier of appeals within the Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar, then the 
problem comes on the number of rungs to be established or to be followed. It is strongly argued that, there is no need 
for the cases starting at Kadhis’ Courts to reach at the level of High Court (Makungu, 2010). It is further insisted that, 
the current practice where a judge sits with four Ulamaas is not what has been proposed as it was suggested for a Chief 
Kadhi to seat with these four Ulamaas instead of a judge (ibid). Thus, this suggestion focused on making Chief Kadhis’ 
Court as the last rung of appeal for all cases emanating from District Kadhis’ Court. 
The involvement of High Court on hearing appeals from Kadhis’ Court causes two issues to emerge; one is the 
involvement of a judge who might be a non-Muslim and two is the involvement of four Ulamaas at the level of High 
Court. On the issue of judge who might be a non-Muslim or Muslim without having knowledge of Islamic law, 
different arguments have been given.  
 
On one side, it is argued that there is no problem for the cases emanating from Kadhis’ Court to reach to the High Court 
once a judge (Whether a non-Muslim judge or Muslim without Islamic knowledge) is sitting with four Muslim scholars 
(Issaya Kayange, 2010). This is substantiated with the argument that, once the decision is reached under the majority 
basis, there is nothing to fear on the implementation of justice (ibid). If one reads between the lines, it may be realised 
that the above arguments might be correct but it must be stressed that when it comes to the point of voting for the 
decision, the presiding judge has the last cast. 
 
It is very likely that where the system is applied or introduced in a jurisdiction where the majority of judges are 
predominantly non-Muslims, problems are likely to occur (Majamba, 2008). Even though it can be argued for the 
judge who is a non-Muslim to undergo training in Islamic law, yet this may be taken to be offensive to most of Muslim 
groups. Though a non-Muslim judge may get a formal training and become well versed in the application of Islamic 
law principles, but in reality it is those who have been groomed in and practice the religion that are likely to have an 
added advantage (ibid). In this respect, it is argued that, the idea of sending cases established from Kadhis’ Courts to 
the High Court must be refrained (Abdallah, 2010). 
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On the issue of involvement of four Ulamaas at the level of High Court, it is insisted that these four Ulamaas must not 
sit with a High Court judge because most of the time these four Ulamaas have not the qualifications that the Chief 
Kadhi has (Makungu, 2010). Therefore, by allowing these Ulamaas to sit at the higher level (High Court) to hear 
appeals from Chief Kadhis’ Court, this might cause problems within the Muslim scholars. It is further argued that in 
order for the Kadhis’ Courts to work properly in Zanzibar, there must be separate systems between Ordinary Courts and 
Kadhis’ Courts (Mubarak, 2010). To put this into effect, it is suggested for the Chief Kadhi to administer Islamic issues 
within the jurisdiction of Kadhis’ Courts and the Chief Justice to administer all matters under the ordinary courts (ibid). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing, those who are trained as advocates and judges under common law doctrine have much influence 
in the determination of the Sharī‛ah matters in countries under review. The degree of influence however differs. The 
influence with respect to Nigeria appears greater than Zanzibar. This is because lawyers trained in common law have 
an unhindered access to the Sharī‛ah courts. They appear as counsel representing litigants in the Sharī‛ah courts. 
This is not withstanding their inadequate knowledge of the Sharī‛ah since they not wholly trained or are partly 
trained in this legal jurisprudence. It needs to be observed that we are not in doubt as to the role of regal practitioners 
in a court of law. The issue seems to be that which role a counsel not adequately trained in the Islamic legal 
jurisprudence will to play in the Sharī‛ah courts. Their contribution in the Sharī‛ah courts will be nothing but 
increased costs, delay and undue adherence to legal technicalities. The position seems to be different in Zanzibar. 
This is because advocates have no rights of audience in the Kadhis (Sharia) Courts. They can appear at the High 
Court level. This also does not adequately balance the position. The effect of this as stated in this paper is that the 
interests of weak clients will not be adequately represented in the court. The better approach seems to be that those 
who are certified as learned in the Sharī‛ah should be allowed to act as advocates in the  Sharī‛ah/Kadhis courts in 
both countries. This will really assist the courts in coming to a just conclusion. 
 
In the same vein, the influence of those trained in common law is well pronounced in the adjudication of Sharī‛ah 
matters in courts. This is especially at appellate levels. In Nigeria, for instance, the trends in the appointment of the 
Sharī‛ah Khadis ( judges) seems to favour those who are trained in common law and the  Sharī‛ah. This position 
appears to be a welcome development. However, this should not be to the detriment of those who are specially 
trained in the Sharī‛ah itself. Emphasis should be laid on the knowledge of the law and other criteria for judicial 
appointments. In Zanzibar, those who sit as Kadhis in the Kadhis’ ( Sharī‛ah) courts must be learned in the  
Sharī‛ah. The problem in both countries seems to relate to the issues of appeals in  Sharī‛ah matters. This is 
because the common law trained judges have some influence in the determination of the appeals. Yet, they do not 
and are not required to have sufficient knowledge of the Sharī‛ah better than the original Sharī‛ah courts judges. 
This is the best way to justify their sitting on the Sharī‛ah matters as appellate courts. There is therefore the need to 
recognize the Sharī‛ah as a distinct source of legal jurisprudence and make sure that its officers in the temple of 
justice have sufficient knowledge of the Sharī‛ah. It is only then that justice will not only be done to the parties but 
will also be manifestly seen to be done in those courts. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The substance of our argument is that the decision was based on a misinterpretation of the relevant 
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provisions of the 1979 Constitution. Justice Mohammed JCA, who delivered the lead judgment in the appeal, read 
the proviso to subsection (1) to section 33 as if it was also a proviso to subsection (4). This oversight, in our humble 
opinion, was responsible for the erroneous decision. A.A. Oba 2002 “Islamic law as customary law: the changing 
perspective in Nigeria” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51, 817 – 850. 
Note 2. These reasons are, in summary: 1 There was an erroneous reading of the relevant constitutional provisions. 2 
Full arguments were not taken on the point before the Court of Appeal as counsel for the respondent conceded the 
point without argument. 3 The other two judges in the case did not write judgments of their own but merely 
concurred with the lead judgment.4 There was no further appeal to the Supreme Court in the case. 5 The judgment of 
the Court of Appeal was not widely circulated and thus could not be subjected to critical analysis. The only ‘report’ 
of the appeal to my knowledge is Mahmood 1993, published eight years after the judgment.  
Note 3. Wakil is defined by Rule 6 of the Legal Practitioners Rules, Chapter 28 of the Law of Zanzibar, 1946 as a 
person admitted to practice as such as licensed to practice as such under this Rule. Most of the time these Wakils are 
those retired court clerks or magistrates given the opportunity to represent litigants before the court of law. It can be 
observed from practical point of view that the idea of appointing Wakils by that time might be good especially with 
the shortage of qualified advocate which faced Zanzibar till in the recent years but with the good number of lawyers 
now in Zanzibar the need of having these Wakils cannot be justified. 
Note 4 Legal Practitioners from both LL.B. Civil Law and LL.B. Combined Law programs are appointed in many 
states as Area Court judges. The Constitutional qualification for appointment as Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal 
allows common law practitioners to be appointed: s. 276(3) (a), 1999 Constitution. 
Note 5. The Council cannot be an appropriate body to decide this since, out of its 21 members, only one (a Grand 
Kadi appointed by the Chief Justice) represents the  Sharī‛ah. 18 others are judges or lawyers, while two are non 
lawyers: Item 20, Part I, Third Schedule, 1999 Constitution. 
Note 6. It is significant that s. 5(a), Sharia Court of Appeal Law, includes the religious qualification.  
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